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Abstract 
Based on decades of combined experience in teaching, observing and working with decision makers, we realized 
that the praxis of decision making as well as our own approach has always been transdisciplinary.  Therefore in 
this paper we offer a transdisciplinary model of decision making at three levels of reality, namely model, method 
and tool.  We conduct our inquiry in the realm of human-social studies, and argue that in this realm we need to 
transcend the traditional hard sciences and include a soft approach.  Along the way we examine the concept of 
transdisciplinarity within human-social studies, and introduce the concept of meta-knowledge.  Examining the 
UHVHDUFKDQGWHDFKLQJRIGHFLVLRQPDNLQJRQWKLVEDVLVZHVXJJHVWWKDWµFRIIHHKRXVHSKLORVRSKHUV¶VKRXOGWHDFK
about decision making, bringing in practicing decision makers whom they interview, while students will need to 
JRWKURXJKDSURFHVVRIµERRWVWUDSOHDUQLQJ¶ figuring out their decision problems. 
Keywords:  decision making, transdisciplinarity, meta-knowledge 
Introduction 
³If the human brain were so simple that we could understand it, 
we would be so simple that we couldn't.´ 
Emerson M. Pugh1 
Paraphrasing John Locke¶V [1] book title, in this essay we speculate about how people make decisions.  
We, the authors of this essay, have been teaching about decisions for several decades, primarily in 
business schools, but also as guest teachers in medical, sport, engineering, psychology, and law schools.  
This essay is a personal take on the way we perceive decisions and teach about decision making, as well 
as how we realized, with hindsight, that our approach has always been transdisciplinary.  However, this 
is not only a µO¶DUWSRXUO¶DUW¶ musings on decisions ± although it started as such.  We view this essay as 
a nuanced conceptual starting point, necessary for a future empirical study. 
When talking about decisions we implicitly talk about thinking, and therefore knowledge.  More 
precisely, we are interested in fast (intuitive) decisions [2], and the knowledge required for it.  We base 
our conceptualization RI NQRZOHGJH RQ 3ROiQ\L¶V notions of µpersonal kQRZOHGJH¶ [3] DQG µWDFLW
NQRZLQJ¶ [4].  Instead of engaging with the scholarly endeavors VLQFH3ROiQ\L¶Vfoundational work, we 
go back to the original work in which we build our approach directly.  From this basis, we explore the 
scientific approach to knowledge, and argue that if we want to achieve a rich picture of knowledge, we 
need a more open approach than that which the dogmatic view of positivist science would allow. A 
proper scientific account of knowledge must be to some extent unscientific. 
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 4XRWHGLQµThe Biological Origin of Human Values¶ by George Edgin Pugh (1977).  $XWKRU¶VQRWH Quote from 
my father around 1938.  Biologist Lyall Watson, described it as ³WKH&DWFK-22 of the biology of consciousness.´ 
The reason for this is the following:  Ignoring tacit knowledge leads to such a limited view that it loses 
touch with reality.  In turn, tacit knowledge cannot be meaningfully examined within a purely positivist 
framework.  As a mathematician friend of ours, who works in psychology, said:  µNo one who attempts 
to analyze the unconscious has actually understood it.¶  In essence, if it could be analyzed, it would not 
be unconscious.  Paraphrasing this maxim, our starting assertion is that tacit knowing cannot be 
analyzed.  In positivist science, analyzing means taking apart, modelling in the algorithmic sense, and 
describing as a well-structured process, which cannot be done with tacit knowledge.  This does not 
mean, however, that we cannot theorize about the nature of tacit knowing, examine the purpose for 
which it can be useful, when, and particularly whose tacit knowing to trust. 
As with any discussion on the topic of tacit knowledge, our argument in this essay is also somewhat 
unscientific.  The reason is that we want to bring together several highly complex concepts, and we 
believe that aiming for the intuitive understanding of the readers, using a personal account, is more 
fruitful than listing who said what.  $QGZHEHOLHYHWKDW³>W@RRPDQ\GHILQLWLRQVNLOOULJRUZKLFKLVZK\
SRHWLF NQRZOHGJH LV PRUH ULJRURXV WKDQ VFLHQWLILF NQRZOHGJH´ [5].  Therefore we do not offer a 
traditional literature review, covering a historical overview of the significant milestones of the scholarly 
decision literature [e.g. 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14] and a review of what can be considered up-to-date 
[such as 15; 16; 17; 18].  Instead, here we offer a picture based on our personal histories, which is 
necessarily subjective and partial.  Similarly to the way mathematicians often elaborate several lemmas 
that are subsequently brought together in the main argument, we take a triple detour following the initial 
exploration of the concept of knowledge.  In the first detour, we elaborate a view according to which it 
LVDQLPSHUDWLYHWRLQFOXGHWKHµVRIWVLGH¶  In the second detour, we use the example of Einstein, as 
reported by Polányi, to demonstrate the necessity of what we call meta-knowledge.  In the third detour, 
we introduce our view of transdisciplinarity.  Finally, we bring these three approaches together to 
elaborate our new model of decision making.  In our concluding remarks, we present our personal view 
of decisions and of teaching about decisions. 
A philosophical detour: towards a soft approach 
We start with a personal example of a chain of master-apprentice relationships [3; 19; 20].  Zoltán 
Baracskai (the first named author) started his journey as a scholar in 1979, when his master told him to 
read PolányL¶V book µ3HUVRQDO.QRZOHGJH¶ =ROWiQWKHQJDYH WKHVDPHERRNWR9LNWRU Dörfler (the 
second named author), Viktor to his apprentice who then gave it to his apprentice.  :HGRQ¶WZDQWWR
suggest that =ROWiQ¶VPDVWHUand the apprentice of 9LNWRU¶Vapprentice PDGHWKHVDPHVHQVHRI3ROiQ\L¶V
work.  However, all of us realized that it makes no sense trying to dissect tacit knowledge, trying to find 
its constituents, or model it.  In this essay tacit knowledge is the fixed point, using which, in 
Archimedes¶words, we try to move the world ± i.e. to understand decision making better. 
We studied the philosophy of science with Kuhn [21; 22], Popper [23; 24] and Feyerabend [25; 26], 
and will continue studying such esteemed thinkers.  However, their works were of limited help, as we 
dedicated our lives, as scholars, to the research within the soft scope, namely within the human-social 
studies, while the major works in philosophy of science refer to the hard sciences.  The concept of 
science (scientific knowledge) is controversial, as it is impossible to divorce scientific knowledge from 
other forms of knowledge.  Why?  Because, DFFRUGLQJWR3ROiQ\L¶VIDPRXVGLFWXP, all knowledge is 
rooted in the tacit dimension: 
While tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must rely on being 
tacitly understood and applied.  Hence all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit 
knowledge.  A wholly explicit knowledge is unthinkable. [27] 
Dogmatic scientists sometimes argue that only positivist science qualifies as science, basing their 
argument on the use of they refer to as the µVFLHQWLILFPHWKRG¶And, as Heisenberg says: 
Confidence in the scientific method and in rational thinking replaced all other safeguards 
of the human mind. [28] 
However, even the hardest of sciences, physics, cannot be fully locked into the positivist box anymore.  
To talk about knowledge in the strictly positivist framework, we would need to derive a 
conceptualization of knowledge from matter, as in a strictly positivist science everything has to be 
derived from matter.  As Schrödinger warns us, with reference to consciousness: 
³$OO WKLV LV SXUH IDQWDV\ DV LUUHIXWDEOH DV LW LV XQSURYDEOH DQG WKXV RI QR value for 
NQRZOHGJH´ [29] 
Physics actually seems to be doing somewhat better than the human and social studies in abandoning 
some obsolete requirements of the scientific enterprise.  There have been numerous physicists recently 
(e.g. Geoffrey Chew, David Bohm, Robert B. Laughlin) transgressing the positivist boundaries in an 
attempt to broaden their horizons.  Scholars in the human-social studies far too often try to copy an 
obsolete world of physics; this is the essence of what von Hayek [30; 31; 32] UHIHUVWRDVµVFLHQWLVP¶.  
While we do not intend to offer a different demarcation or classification between science and non-
science here, we suggest that a non-positivist or even anti-positivist perspective needs to be included in 
studying decision making.  7RUHSUHVHQW WKLV µRWKHU VLGH¶ZHEring in Bourdieu¶V [33] sociological 
approach. 
Umberto Eco SLFWXUHVVFLHQWLVWVEHFRPLQJOLNHPRQNVLQDPRQDVWHU\LVRODWHGIURPWKHµUHDOZRUOG¶
occasionally maybe visiting it, but living and working separately from it.  Bourdieu [33] explains this 
through the mathematization of science, which helped hard sciences, and particularly physics, in 
gradually achieving considerable autonomy, but at the same time, being a mathematician became an 
entry-barrier to science, drawing a line between professionals and amateurs, and then between insiders 
and outsiders.  Unfortunately, this also led to a severe reduction of the readership, as reading science 
books or papers started to mean reading equations: after a while, only insiders were able to read what 
other insiders wrote.  In the soft knowledge domains in general and in decision making in particular, a 
similar tendency can be observed and we believe that this can lead to catastrophic consequences; what 
&DWK\2¶1HLO2 FDOOVµweapons of math destruction¶LQKHU7('7DON 
In hard sciences, a lot can be achieved looking at the world from the outside.  When designing a 
machine, we do not need to become cogs in order to understand how the machine works.  To understand 
atomic interactions we do not need to become quarks.  In the human-social studies, we cannot avoid 
being humans nor being social.  If we separate ourselves from the world of humans, lock ourselves into 
a monastery, we cannot understand that world.  This, however, leads to an interesting and very tricky 
situation in teaching.  For example, should practicing decision makers teach about decision making?  
1R WKH\ VKRXOGQ¶W, as they cannot teach (there may be exceptions but those are rare).  Should we 
therefore get the highest ranked academics (assuming that they are excellent teachers) to teach about 
decision making?  There is also a serious limitation to this; in pursuing such academic careers, 
academics then remove themselves from the praxis of decision making.  They can teach, but they cannot 
reflect on the praxis as they are not part of it.  So who should teach about decision making and how?  
We are searching for an answer to this question for several decades, and this paradox drives out 
exploration in this paper. 
The Universal Truth, the ideal of fully objective science3, is not an external entity that we are 
approaching, but a complex system of partial and subjective truths.  We do not need to give up our 
subjectivity trying to be governed by an externally given objective truth, but we need to embrace our 
subjectivity and pursue it, in order to create a universal truth that emerges from the synergistic assembly 
of all which is partial and subjective.  We could even say that this is our interpreWDWLRQRI3RSSHU¶V [23] 
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 https://www.ted.com/talks/cathy_o_neil_the_era_of_blind_faith_in_big_data_must_end 
3
 Our assertion only applies to the idea of the objective Universal Truth in science; the idea of spiritual Universal 
Truth is outwith the scope of this inquiry. 
conceptualization of inter-subjectivity, which he offers as a replacement for the notion of objectivity.  
This is hard enough to do in the hard sciences, but in the human-social studies it is many times harder.  
The reason is that any human-social inquiry needs to make itself also part of its own inquiry [cf 33].  
And this is also the point where, for the first time since antiquity, human-social studies can advance 
beyond the hard sciences and become the example that the hard sciences may follow.  This is why we 
said earlier with reference to hard sciences that it is not exactly true that we do not need to become cogs 
and quarks.  Heisenberg recognized that ³in the drama of existence we are ourselves both players and 
spectators´. Although hard sciences can still progress without accepting this, their pursuit of science 
will come to halt, and they will need to accept it eventually.  It is up to us in the human-social studies 
to do the pioneering work, as we cannot progress if we detach ourselves from our subject of inquiry, as 
that would mean detaching ourselves from ourselves. 
A methodological detour: towards a meta-knowledge-approach 
We start with a story of the experimental implications of Einstein¶VWKHRU\RIrelativity, DQG3ROiQ\L¶V
[34] DQDO\VLVRIWKLVUHPDUNDEOHFDVHRI(LQVWHLQ¶VLQWXLWLRQThe particular experiment in case is the 
Michelson-Morley experiment that established that a light source would never overtake a beam sent out 
by it.  Importantly, the Michelson-Morley experiment was conducted earlier than Einstein developed 
his conceptualization of relativity.  In his autobiography, Einstein offered an account according to which 
he intuitively recognized the nature of light.  This was without being familiar with the experimental 
results of Michelson and Morley where Einstein made the same assumption from the start.  It was 
assumed that Einstein must have known of the experiment and his conceptualization of relativity was 
the way of providing the conceptual framing for the experimental results.  In contrast, Polányi argues 
that: 
>«@ZKHQ(LQVWHLQ H[WHQGHGKLV YLVLRQ WR the universe and included the case of a light 
source emitting a beam, he could make sense of what he then faced only by seeing it in such 
a way that the beam was never overtaken, however slightly, by its source.  This is what he 
meant by saying that he knew intuitively that this was in fact the case. [34] 
According to Polányi this vision led Einstein to the conceptualization of relativity, which does explain 
the Michelson-Morley experiment but, contradictory to the general belief, is not based on it.  What we 
find in this story is what we tentatively label meta-knowledge.  As there is a small problem with this 
label: it may be read DVµNQRZOHGJHDERXWNQRZOHGJH¶7KLVLVQRWZKDWZHPHDQKHUH:KDWZHUHIHU
WRZLWKWKHµPHWD-¶ is a very high level of abstraction, something that we can call meta-level.  At a high 
level of abstraction, where the details of reality dissolve, such knowledge loses direct touch with reality.  
+RZHYHU LW FDQ EH µFRQFUHWL]HG¶ E\ ]RRPLQJ into UHDOLW\ DQG LQ WKLV µFRQFUHWL]DWLRQ¶ the meta-
knowledge can take radically different forms.  For instance, it may take the form of some knowledge 
with reference to one reality and some different knowledge with reference to some other reality.  For 
this reason, meta-knowledge does not consist of concepts but of meta-concepts, which are extremely 
high-density essences of many concepts.  This is why we discussed great thinkers in the above 
examples: those who see the totality of their disciplines possess meta-knowledge and develop meta-
concepts.  Usually there are no words corresponding to meta-concepts, therefore the great thinkers often 
communicate their meta-knowledge in the form of metaphors, ZKLFKLVDQRWKHUUHDVRQWRXVHWKHµPHWD-¶ 
label. 
Meta-knowledge is heavily tacit.  This meta-knowledge, and its tacit nature, is what enables the greatest 
thinkers to demonstrate sometimes almost supernatural abilities, which may at times present as ³extra-
sensory perception´ or ³acts of precognition or apparent clairvoyance´ [35].  We would risk the 
assertion that every single great breakthrough in science has been achieved in this way, even when the 
story is not as striking as the one about Einstein. 
Meta-knowledge, in contrast with low-level (i.e. closer to reality) well-structured concepts, cannot be 
directly transferred.  If great thinkers teach, they will not attempt to transfer their meta-knowledge.  
They are the only ones who can apply their own meta-knowledge.  Yet, through metaphors, and/or 
ODUJHUPHWDSKRULFQDUUDWLYHVFDOOHGSDUDEOHVJUHDWWKLQNHUVFDQµVHQG¶PHWD-concepts that the talented 
OHDUQHUVFDQµUHFHLYH¶UHLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHPHWD-concepts their own way, and develop their own meta-
knowledge.  When learners receive a meta-concept from a discipline that is not their native discipline, 
they will not magically become µPDVWHUV¶ of the new discipline, but they will be able to grasp some of 
its essence.  Talented learners can use the deep insight embedded in the meta-knowledge to enrich their 
own knowledge of their own discipline. 
We can learn one further thing about the nature of meta-NQRZOHGJHIURP(LQVWHLQ¶VVWRU\.  Intuitively 
apprehending the experimental facts, from which he had no prior knowledge, was not possible whilst 
remaining within the discipline of physics; Einstein had to transcend the disciplinary boundaries.  We 
use this as an illustration, as a justification but not a verification, that the disciplinary boundaries must 
be transcended for the highest achievements7KLVOHGXVWRFRQVLGHU1LFROHVFX¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRI
transdisciplinarity. 
A conceptual detour: towards a transdisciplinary approach 
We know that the initial framing of transdisciplinarity can be traced back to Piaget [36], but it was 
Nicolescu [e.g. 37] who developed it into a full conceptualization.  Henceforth when we use the term 
µtransdisciplinarity¶ ZH UHIHU WR 1LFROHVFX¶V FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ  Interestingly, or perhaps quite 
understandably, Nicolescu transcended his own discipline of quantum physics the same way as the 
above mentioned scientists.  He is also comfortable in the realms of philosophy, art and religion.  Now 
we try to work out how this conceptualization of transdisciplinarity can work in the human-social 
studies, whether we see any limitations or barriers, and what we can learn from this attempt.  There 
were numerous applications of transdisciplinarity to particular problems in human-social studies, but 
here we are interested in the overall knowledge domain ± not in a particular problem.  Before applying 
WUDQVGLVFLSOLQDULW\ DV D OHQV IRU RXU LQTXLU\ ZH QHHG WR H[SODLQ KRZ ZH XQGHUVWDQG 1LFROHVFX¶V
conceptualization. 
%HIRUHZHGLVFRYHUHG1LFROHVFX¶V [38; 39; 40] work we constantly tried to position ourselves within 
multi- and/or interdisciplinarity and we were constantly dissatisfied with what these two concepts could 
offer.  We did not yet know that our approach was, and has always been, transdisciplinary.  Here, we 
want to explain the subtle but significant differences multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity using a 
powerful metaphor, which Nicolescu [41] used in his seminar talk.  In this metaphor, disciplines are 
represented by birds in their cages. 
A mono-disciplinary approach is when we only have one bird in one cage.  This bird, remaining in its 
cage, observes reality outside its cage, the room that represents the problem area, through the grid of 
the cage.  Looking at this picture from the outside it is perfectly clear that what this bird sees is 
necessarily partial, subjective and distorted.  However, from within the cage this cannot be seen; the 
bird can think that it observes reality as it is.  If we bring in further birds of different species, each of 
them in its own cage, we can have a multidisciplinary approach.  Each bird sees its mono-disciplinary 
SLFWXUHEXWWKH\µWDON¶WRHDFKRWKHUAs the name suggests, it is a multiplication of mono-disciplinary 
approaches, which presents a far richer picture than what mono-disciplinarity can offer.  Still, it has 
severe limitations.  Each observation refers to the complete picture of what each bird can see and, as 
they belong to different species, their knowledge backgrounds, approaches, ontological and 
epistemological stances, and also songs (professional jargons) are different.  Ultimately, such 
observations can lead to cacophony of songs, i.e. immensely complicated (but not complex) mutually 
incompatible results.  If we are outside the cages, we will probably leave the room, since all we can 
hear is immense noise.  Most importantly, the birds are still in cages, meaning that we are still bound 
by disciplinarity. 
Interdisciplinarity usually involves fewer birds.  Suppose, we temporarily bring over one bird of other 
species into the cage of another bird from a different species.  The host bird will learn a bit of the songs 
of the guest birds.  It may not learn the songs very well, but enough to get something new from them.  
This can be a new concept, an approach, but most probably a method and/or a tool.  For example, a 
psychologist host bird may borrow a statistical method from a mathematician guest bird, and a harmony 
concept from a musical guest bird.  :HGRQ¶WKDYHDGHILQLWHDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIwhether the 
adopted method and the new concept will result in a displacement of original concepts [42] in the host 
ELUG¶V original discipline. We believe the answer depends on the docility of the host bird.  An 
interdisciplinary inquiry is not as noisy as the multidisciplinary one; it is somewhat more complex and 
less complicated.  It can lead to meaningful results within the cage of the host bird.  The Sword of 
Damocles of interdisciplinary research is that the presumptions behind the borrowed methods, concepts, 
etc. may not be synchronized with the background knowledge of the host bird.  It is possible that there 
are hidden irreconcilable inconsistencies.  However, if the host bird is docile and learns the songs of the 
guest birds well, the quality of such inquiry can be excellent.  Still, the notion of interdisciplinarity is 
very limited, since the birds remain in cages.  However, the docility and second-language knowledge 
of the host bird can expand the cage. 
NRZOHW¶V open the cage doors, and let the birds fly outside of their limited habitats.  This new setup 
brings us into transdisciplinarity.  The birds are freely flying beyond their cages, although most of them 
will probably choose to return to their cages sooner or later in order to eat and rest.  We are all most 
comfortable within our own disciplines, but many of us also find our disciplines limiting, and even 
boring at times.  Some of us may even fall in love with the second-language songs so much that we 
keep whistling them after our guests return home.  Bourdieu, Nicolescu, and Einstein are excellent 
examples of this phenomenon.  The greatest thing about transdisciplinarity is that it goes beyond the 
disciplinary boundaries in principle, not only beyond the boundary of a particular discipline.  
Transdisciplinarity does not just allow us to visit a different cage; it gives us an opportunity to create 
new knowledge in the no man¶s land between cages.  Such knowledge may achieve immensely high 
complexity but should not be very complicated.  The birds now seem to be perfectly in tune, as they are 
together in the space between the cages, and we hear one beautiful, harmonious, polyphonic song. 
Teaching about decisions has been multidisciplinary for a long time, and it still is.  In business schools 
operational researchers build quantitative models based on linear programming (and its recent 
advances) or statistics and probability theory.  In schools of psychology, cognitive psychologists focus 
on the role of memory and biases, while others detail aspects of personality and motivation.  Some 
economists calculate expected utility functions, while other economists who are better mathematicians 
build simulated models based on game theory.  Operational researchers, psychologists and economists 
rarely talk to each other or use each RWKHU¶V ZRUN  ,Q FRQWUDVW to teaching, decision research has 
predominantly been interdisciplinary.  We could list the previous examples of operational researchers, 
psychologists and economists; the difference would be that there is some interaction.  Sometimes a tool, 
a method or a concept is borrowed, occasionally a model or another form of result is lent.  These 
disciplines, and some additional ones, such as artificial intelligence, social psychology and philosophy, 
PHHWDURXQGDSUREOHPGRPDLQWKDWLVFXUUHQWO\NQRZQDVµFRJQLWLYHVFLHQFHV¶7KLVLVDYHU\JRRG
label, as it signifies the multiplicity of disciplines.  However, the reality of decisions has always been 
transdisciplinary.  Thus, being engaged with practicing decision makers, our approach has become 
transdisciplinary as well ± only we did not know what it was called. 
Transdisciplinarity offers some methodological guidelines for scholars.  Following these guidelines, we 
distinguish between various levels of reality, similarly to 5XVVHOO¶V logical types [43].  On each level of 
reality, bivalent logic may be valid; however, transdisciplinary also transcends bivalent logic.  This 
means that something and the opposite of something can hold true at the same time.  Using the notations 
of logic this means that something can be A and non-A at the same time; Nicolescu call this third 
possibility TWKHµKLGGHQWKLUG¶T is obtained by the synthesis of A and non-A, as Fichte [44] did in 
his thesis-antithesis-synthesis cycle4, and this is what we can see in the Taoist tradition of Yin and Yang.  
This synthesis enables moving between the levels of reality. 
Now, after introducing our soft approach at a philosophical level, meta-knowledge at a methodological 
level and transdisciplinarity at a conceptual level we are ready to introduce our new model of decision 
making. 
A new model: the realities of decision making 
After this triple detour, in this section we finally outline our main point: a new model of decision 
making.  Based on decades of combined experience in teaching, observing and working with decision 
makers, we realized something very important.  It is impossible to support decisions; we can only 
support decision makers.  In order to portray decision making as we see it, we use a transdisciplinary 
lens, so that we can observe the decision maker as birds flying freely between the cages.  At the core of 
decision making we focus on meta-knowledge, which we argue is necessarily tacit.  And we bring in 
the soft approach, as the antithesis of the hard, to achieve a synthesis in order to move between the 
realities, that is, levels of reality which thus becomes more nuanced. 
Therefore, for the sake of our exploratory thinking presented here, we describe decision making with 
the following three levels of reality: 
1. Model RIWKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU¶VEHKDYLRU 
2. Method used to support the decision maker. 
3. Tool we use to implement the support of the decision maker. 
On each of these levels, we distinguish the observer and the observed, and for each of them provide the 
A, non-A and T the following way (see Table 1): 
At the model-level, the decision maker (in a particular decision situation) can be a rule-follower (A) or 
a misbehaver (non-A).  The notion of the rule-IROORZHULVOLQNHGWR0DUFK¶V [45] concept of µDSSURSULDWH
DFWLRQ¶DFFRUGLQJWRZKLch decision makers do what is expected from them.  That is they follow the 
rules, not only the standardized procedures, but also the expected behavior.  In contrast, those who 
misbehave [18] demonstrate notorious neglect of not only expected behavior, but often also of the 
standardized procedures.  As behavioral patterns, the two (A and non-A) can be considered mutually 
exclusive: those who follow the rules do not misbehave, and those who misbehave do not follow the 
rules.  However, the two contradictory behavioral patterns can be synthesized in a more complex 
cognition (T).  The decision maker using both hard and soft approaches knows the rules and follows 
them when necessary and/or useful, but also knows which rules can be broken under which conditions 
and how often.  Such decision maker will demonstrate both rule-following as well as misbehaving 
behavioral patterns.  In observing the decision maker we can see a Homo Calculator (A), the person 
who mainly does mental accounting [18].  Or a Homo Ludens (non-A), a playing man, who is playful 
and curious like a child, who allows her-KLPVHOIWRDGPLUHWKHZRUOG¶VZonders.  As a synthesis, we 
can see a Homo Sapiens (T), a wise man, who finds the harmony between playing and calculating.  Such 
a decision maker measures what can be measured, calculates what can be calculated, but does not force 
measuring and calculating on things that cannot be measured and calculated.  This is when (s)he uses 
her/his imagination. 
At the method-level, the rule-following decision maker uses a variant of MCDA (multi-criteria decision 
analysis), nearly always in a quantitative mode (A).  The misbehaving decision maker, in contrast, uses 
intuition DVDµPHWKRG¶ [14], they refer to their gut feel, hunch, overall experience, etc.  Indeed, only 
experienced decision makers should use their intuition [46].  The synthesis of the two methods we call 
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 7\SLFDOO\EXWLQFRUUHFWO\DWWULEXWHGWR+HJHO¶VGLDOHFWLF$OWKRXJK+HJHOGLGQRWLQWURGXFHRUXVHWKHWULDGRI
thesis-antithesis-V\QWKHVLVWUDQVFHQGLQJGLFKRWRPLHVLVDQLPSRUWDQWDVSHFWRI+HJHO¶VLGHDOLVP 
µcomplex order¶77KLVVLJQLILHVERWKWKDWWKLVRUGHUFDQQRWEHUHGXFHGWRDVLPSOHRQHRUVHYHUDO
simple ones (which would only be complicated but not complex), and also that it is multidimensional.  
Intuition and well-structured analysis are not only side-by-side but also hand-in-hand; it may involve 
intuitive reinterpretation of the analytical findings as well as new analysis based on a hunch, etc. [cf 47; 
48]  As observers, we see the Homo Calculator using algorithms (A), in the sense of following recipes, 
assuming that these are eternally and universally valid, and they are often surprised why the recipe does 
not work.  In contrast, what the Homo Ludens does is often non-algorithmic or, at least, quasi-
algorithmic (non-A).  Non-algorithmic here means that it appears arbitrary to us, we cannot detect any 
series of logical steps.  Quasi-algorithmic, in turn, means that we may see shorter or longer sequences 
of steps, but not an overall designed process, the steps may go now this way then another way.  As a 
synthesis, we can observe a complex system, as in Boulding¶V [49] levels 7-8 (human and social) of 
systemic complexity, including emergent phenomena that cannot be reduced to the level of the 
thermostat (level 3). 
At the tool-level, the rule-following decision maker, who adopted an MCDA method uses some form 
of BI (business intelligence), to implement the method, not necessarily knowing what the chosen BI-
tool does (A).  In contrast, misbehaving decision makers, who use their intuition, usually feel that they 
GRQ¶W QHHG D WRRO  However, they also often feel that they benefit from a good conversation with 
someone who can be a partner in this, such as a good coach.  Nevertheless, there is one type of tool that 
can be useful in supporting such thinking: expert systems (non-A).  Expert systems can help organize 
the thinking of such decision makers in a transparent way, which can be particularly useful for 
explaining the hidden logic behind their intuitions.  Synthesizing these two tools we get what we call 
SmArt decision tools 70DNLQJERWKWKHµ6¶DQGWKHµ$¶FDSLWDOVLJQLILHVWKDWWKLVLVDVPXFKµ$UW¶DV
µ6PDUW¶; it incorporates both analysis and soft approaches, such as expert systems.  As yet we have 
conceptualized the SmArt Tool, but we must admit the tool does not currently exist.  Observing the 
tools decision makers use, we can see that the Homo Calculator, who follows algorithms, relies on data 
analytics, which is increasingly taking the form of big data analytics (A).  This shift towards big data 
analytics is unfortunate, as it is based on the conviction that the way to improve data analysis is through 
analyzing more data, rather than by doing more thinking.  WHUHIHUWRWKLVSKHQRPHQRQDVµELJGDWD± 
VPDOOLQVLJKW¶7KH+RPR/XGHQVZLWKKHUKLVQRQ- and quasi-algorithmic methods can be supported 
through knowledge engineering (non-A).  Knowledge engineers are a special kind of facilitators, who 
build expert systems by acquiring knowledge from the decision makers and organizing this knowledge 
into knowledge bases.  Finally, synthesizing [big] data analytics with knowledge engineering will 
require a new concept.  One possibility would be something that we tentatively call experience mining 
(T), which is a way of finding and adapting relevant experience to the current decision problem.  Many 
aspects of the way experience mining will work are yet unclear.  TŚŝƐŝƐǁŚĂƚǁĞƐŝŐŶŝĨǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ? ? ?
symbol (Table 1).  We do not know yet what the process will look like that incorporates both [big] data 
analytics and knowledge engineering.  First, we will need to create SmArt tool, so that we can then 
develop the process for using it.  We have some ideas about what this process could be, but the 
development of the tool does not follow a prior design of a well-structured process.  Cars were not 
developed after the process of driving and traffic system were designed; arguably cars, driving and 
traffic systems all would be very different today, if the latter were designed first.  Furthermore, once 
we can get rid of the question mark, regardless of whether we end up with experience mining or 
another new concept, we may be able to recognize the next level of reality. 
Table 1: Levels of reality of decision making 
This is how we see decision making today, using the lens of transdisciplinarity based on NicoleVFX¶V
conceptualization.  These are the three levels of reality WKDWZHFDQVHH%DVHGRQWKHµ"¶LQWKHfinal 
cell of Table 1, we also see a few things about the possible fourth level of reality, which will inform the 
way ZHWHDFKDERXWIDVWGHFLVLRQVWRPRUURZ)RUH[DPSOHZHVHHWKDWWRPRUURZ¶VGHFLVLRQPDNHUV
are Shallows [50], whose attention needs to jump after a very short time (approximately 15 minutes at 
most) even when they are doing something exceptionally exciting, such as listening to a good teacher. 
Concluding remarks: teaching about fast decisions tomorrow 
We believe that our audience tomorrow will be Shallows.  In addition, we have argued that neither the 
teacher nor the practitioner are really suitable to teach about decision making.  So, who should be 
teaching, what should they be teaching, and how, when it comes to decision making? 
7KHµZKDW¶KHUHFRQVLVWVRIWZRSDUWVERWKFRYHUHGLQWKLVHVVD\First, the topics should be along the 
lines of our table, or an alternative view of decisions.  The particular topics are not important, what 
PDWWHUVLVWKDWWKH\DUHIUHVKDQGEDVHGRQDFRKHUHQWµELJSLFWXUH¶RIGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ; what the teacher 
sees µthen and there¶ [cf 'egocentric particulars' in 51].  This is primarily important from the viewpoint 
of credibility: if we teach something other than what we believe in then it will be perceived as 
inauthentic by students.  However, it is also important in the sense of not delivering outdated knowledge, 
as the world of decision making is changing too fast.  Second, the topic should be delivered in the form 
of meta-knowledge.  This is, again, important for two reasons.  On the one hand, meta-knowledge is 
more applicable to different real-life situations.  If we could elaborate in detail what works in a particular 
decision situation, this would only work in that single situation, nowhere else.  Meta-knowledge, as 
showcased earlier, can take different shapes in different real-life situations.  On the other hand, in any 
classroom where we have practitioners, we will have people with a wide variety of knowledge 
backgrounds ± only meta-knowledge can transcend the limitations of existing knowledge variety. 
The most appropriate person to teach decision making could be described through the metaphor of the 
µFRIIHHKRXVHSKLORVRSKHU¶%\WKLVZHPHDQDSHUVRQZKRspeculates about the big questions of the 
human condition, the universe, love, and similar important topics, while sitting in the coffeehouse and 
watching people as they go about their real lives.  The coffeehouse philosopher is not embedded in the 
real world of practicing decision makers, but is also not completely removed from it.  Ideally this would 
be a wise person who started to figure out something important ± it does not really matter what that 
µimportant something¶ is.  However, the coffeehouse philosopher should not do this teaching alone.  
There should be guests, practicing decision makers whom the coffeehouse philosopher will interview 
live in front of the students.  If this works well, both the coffeehouse philosopher as well as the 
practicing decision maker will produce meta-knowledge for the students. 
  Model Method Tool 
Observed 
A rule-following MCDA BI 
Non-A misbehaving intuition expert system 
T cognition complex order SmArt tool 
Observer 
A Homo Calculator algorithm (big) data analytics 
Non-A Homo Ludens non- or quasi-algorithmic knowledge engineering 
T Homo Sapiens complex system experience mining(?) 
This EULQJVXVWRWKHµKRZ¶RIWHDFKLQJ:HEHOLHYHLQVWRU\WHOOLQJ6WRULHVZRUNPXFKEHWWHUWKDQGU\
abstract models, for a number of reasons.  Our students, who are Shallows and practitioners themselves, 
will find it easier to relate to stories than to abstract models and thus achieve an intuitive understanding.  
Also, good stories are much easier to remember.  At least two types of stories should be told in our 
classroom: metaphoric parables by the coffeehouse philosopher and real-life stories of concrete 
experience by the practicing decision makers. 
Finally, we need to separate teaching from learning rather than assuming that learners learn what 
teachers teach.  Our starting point here is that our Shallow practitioner students have decision they need 
to make, and that we cannot provide them with the solution, because we are not part of the specific 
context, and even if we could, it would be of extremely limited use for the next decision they need to 
make. We call the mode in which we can help them bootstrap learning.  We derive the conceptualization 
RI ERRWVWUDS OHDUQLQJ IURP 3RSSHU¶V [24] tentative problem solving process.  Popper initially 
conceptualized the SURFHVV DV LQWHUSUHWLQJ WKH HDUOLHU PHQWLRQHG µGLDOHFWLF WULDG¶ WKHVLV-antithesis-
synthesis) as a trial and error-elimination process.  In doing so, he identified the following schema: 
P1 ² TT ² EE ² P2 
Where P1 and P2 stand for problems (in our case there is a decision that need to be made), TT stands 
for a tentative theory (through which the decision situation is interpreted) and EE stands for error 
elimination (something we are unhappy about in the TT).  It is important to note that in the later revisions 
of this idea Popper emphasized that any of the three components could be a legitimate starting point of 
the tentative problem solving process (in the initial version that starting point was the P1 problem).  In 
our bootstrap learning this would mean that the meta-knowledge can connect to any of the three 
components, changing how the learners see them.  So the meta-knowledge can help the learners see any 
of the P, TT, EE differently than before receiving the meta-knowledge.  However, the meta-knowledge 
does not provide them with a solution, only with some ammunition, using which they can bootstrap 
themselves from the problem situation.  In future decision situations, our students will re-use some of 
the meta-knowledge the same way to make fast (intuitive) decisions.  In this sense, in bootstrap learning 
it becomes very explicit that what is taught and what is learned are two different things. 
In conclusion we want to remark that we do not think that this is what the teaching about fast (intuitive) 
decisions will look like in the future; this is only how we see future teaching about fast (intuitive) 
decisions today.  There are countless unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances, political agendas, 
new technologies, societal changes, etc. that will lead to a different reality tomorrow.  However, this is 
what we work towards today, and even if the world will be different tomorrow than the tomorrow we 
envision today, we will be closer to the reality of tomorrow than those who work on assumptions which 
were outdated yesterday.  We have the A of tomorrow today, there will be a non-A WKDWZHGRQ¶WNQRZ
about yet, and there will be a hidden third version of tomorrow emerging on a new level of reality.  
Therefore, tomorrow we will rethink again what and how to teach about decisions. We will continue 
wandering at the mystery of decision making, as: 
The fairest thing we can experience is the mysterious.  It is the fundamental emotion which 
stands at the cradle of true art and true science.  He who knows it not and can no longer 
wonder, no longer feel amazement, is as good as dead, a snuffed-out candle. [52] 
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